Semblance Hypothesis
Motivation: Most brain functions have traditionally been studied by correlating cellular, molecular and electrophysiological changes to observable behaviors, including speech and other motor actions. If these findings from different levels of the system provide sufficiently strong constraints, they can narrow the solution space for behavior to a small set of possible mechanisms. If one of the mechanisms shows properties (by a thorough examination from all possible angles) that could account for first-person experience, the problem can be studied in a focused, systematic way to experimentally evaluate and validate the candidate mechanism. This realization and hope is behind the motivation.
What is this website about? Since the first-person property is the brain’s most important and unique function – yet it cannot be directly tested – it requires an unconventional approach. Experiments have correlated findings from multiple levels with behavior as a proxy for the first-person property. Accordingly, this work uses constraints derived from major findings at different levels to derive an interconnected explanation for behavior. The solution point is then examined to identify unique properties capable of generating units of the first-person property (inner sensations). This approach resulted in identifying a plausible mechanism. This work continues to examine whether new empirical findings can be explained in an interconnected manner, guided by the principle of falsifiability.
The Problem
The brain has approximately 1011 neurons interconnected by around 1015 synapses. Neuroscience has made substantial progress in correlating neural activity across multiple levels – molecular, synaptic, cellular, and systems – with behavior. However, a fundamental gap remains: there is no mechanistic framework that explains how first-person internal experience arises from neural activity.
This includes:
We must derive a solution – one that also yields testable predictions. Because findings from different levels of the system have been examined by correlating them with behavior, it may be possible to first solve the system at the level of behavior. This approach may allow identification of a solution point, or its immediate vicinity, with properties capable of generating the first-person property. The solution must be falsifiable – that is, there must, in principle, be a conceivable observation that could refute it (Karl Popper, 1965). However, we have been reluctant to search for a mechanism capable of generating first-person property. What are the main roadblocks, and how have we overcome similar problems in the past? Article
Context: To derive a solution for behavior, the theoretical strategy must identify sufficient constraints from experimental findings to derive the structural changes that occur during associative learning. In classical conditioning, since only the unconditioned stimulus (US) elicits motor actions, inputs from both conditioned stimulus (CS) and US can be inferred to converge to a single output neuron to manifest behavior reminiscent of the US. This strategy did not lead to a solution capable of explaining first-person property. A modified conditioning experiment where both the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the US have motor actions will bring additional constraint, which is viewed as a black-box problem that requires a solution (Fig.1). The hope is that this strategy will lead to a testable theoretical solution for both behavior and first-person property.
The challenge: "What I cannot create (replicate), I do not understand" – Richard Feynman. We must approach the task of understanding the nervous system with the rigor required to replicate its mechanisms in an engineered system. Everything else will follow from that foundation.
The optimism: “What are the real conditions that the solution must satisfy?” If we can get that right, then we can try and figure out what the solution is" – Murray Gell–Mann
The hope: We will give our utmost effort. Together, we will explore and uncover it!