Origins

The semblance hypothesis emerged gradually from years spent observing problems that existing ideas could not fully explain. It evolved from a persistent attempt to understand one fundamental question: How does the nervous system generate first-person inner sensations that accompany perception, memory, thought, and consciousness? Although neuroscience has produced an enormous body of knowledge about molecules, synapses, neurons, neural circuits, electrophysiology, and behavior, the mechanism by which the brain generates subjective experience remains unknown. This question became the starting point for the present work.

A different kind of scientific problem

Most organs of the body can be understood from a third-person perspective. The heart pumps blood, the kidneys filter waste, and the liver performs metabolic functions. Their operations can be observed directly or indirectly using established experimental methods. 

The nervous system presents a fundamentally different challenge. Its most distinctive function is the generation of first-person experience, events that are directly accessible only to the individual experiencing them. An outside investigator can observe electrical activity, molecular events, imaging results, speech, and behavior, but cannot directly observe the experience of seeing, remembering, or thinking.

This difference changes the nature of the scientific problem. It suggests that conventional experimental approaches, while indispensable, may not by themselves reveal the operational mechanism responsible for first-person properties. Instead, solving the nervous system requires combining experimental observations with theoretical reasoning.

Lessons from the history of science

Science has repeatedly advanced by introducing concepts that could not be directly perceived. Examples include elementary particles, electromagnetic fields, and mathematical constructs such as complex numbers.  Their existence or usefulness was inferred because they provided coherent explanations for many independent observations.

Galileo did not directly observe the Earth's orbital motion. Instead, he integrated multiple astronomical observations that were difficult to reconcile within the prevailing geocentric framework. Likewise, modern physics frequently infers the existence of imperceptible particles or fields from the constraints imposed by experimental observations.

These examples suggest an important principle: when a phenomenon cannot be observed directly, its existence may still be inferred if it provides the only coherent explanation for a large body of independent evidence. The present work adopts this general philosophy.

Why a theory-driven approach became necessary

The nervous system has been investigated at many levels, including molecular biology, biochemistry, electrophysiology, anatomy, systems neuroscience, psychology, cognitive science, and clinical neurology. Each discipline has contributed valuable observations, yet many findings remain disconnected from one another.

Rather than treating these observations independently, I approached them as constraints on a single underlying mechanism. Every reliable experimental finding limits the range of acceptable explanations. Over more than a century, neuroscience has accumulated thousands of such experimental constraints across multiple levels of organization. Any successful theory should therefore account for as many of these constraints as possible within a single operational framework. As more constraints accumulate, incorrect mechanisms are progressively eliminated. In principle, only mechanisms capable of satisfying all constraints remain viable candidates. 

This approach resembles solving a large system of equations. Individual subsets of observations may permit multiple explanations, but as additional constraints are introduced, the number of possible solutions decreases. If the nervous system is governed by a unifying operational mechanism, progressively integrating experimental constraints should narrow the range of plausible explanations and ultimately identify the mechanism that best accounts for the available evidence.

The objective, therefore, was not to fit selected observations, but to derive a mechanism capable of integrating findings across multiple levels of brain function within a single coherent framework.

How the hypothesis evolved

My academic path crossed several disciplines, including medicine, biochemistry, molecular biology, neuroscience, neurology, cognitive neurology, and physics. Each field contributed a different perspective on the problem.  

Clinical medicine emphasized the importance of relating mechanisms to function. Molecular biology demonstrated the power of reductionist investigation while also revealing its limitations for explaining systems-level phenomena. Neuroscience provided an enormous body of experimental observations but no generally accepted explanation for first-person experience. Clinical neurology highlighted how studying disorders often reveals the normal organization of biological systems. Physics introduced methods for reasoning about entities that cannot be directly perceived and emphasized the importance of deriving solutions from multiple independent constraints.

These experiences gradually reinforced a single conclusion: understanding the nervous system would likely require a theoretical framework capable of integrating evidence across disciplines rather than relying exclusively on discoveries within any one field.

Developing a theoretical framework for the nervous system differs fundamentally from proposing a hypothesis to explain a single experimental finding. It requires repeatedly examining thousands of observations spanning multiple disciplines, identifying their logical implications, and determining whether they can be reconciled by a common operational mechanism. This iterative process of refining constraints, revising candidate mechanisms, and re-evaluating them against new evidence continued over many years before a coherent framework began to emerge.

From constraints to mechanism

The development of the semblance hypothesis did not begin by proposing a new anatomical structure. Instead, it began by asking what properties any successful mechanism must possess.

A mechanism responsible for learning and memory should explain how associative learning modifies the nervous system within physiological timescales, how memories are later retrieved as first-person experiences, how behavior accompanies these experiences, how the mechanism remains reversible for working memory yet stable for long-term memory, and how it integrates with findings spanning molecular biology, electrophysiology, systems neuroscience, behavior, neurological disease, and consciousness.

Only after these requirements had been established did a plausible candidate mechanism emerge. The hypothesis proposes that learning induces a previously unrecognized form of functional interaction between neighboring postsynaptic terminals. These interactions, termed inter-postsynaptic functional LINKs (IPLs), provide a potential explanation for the generation of units of internal sensation while simultaneously accounting for a broad range of experimental observations across multiple levels of nervous system function.

Whether this mechanism is ultimately correct remains an experimental question. Its scientific value lies in its ability to generate specific predictions that can be tested and potentially falsified.

An ongoing scientific journey

The semblance hypothesis should be regarded as a scientific hypothesis rather than an established fact. Its validity depends not on its elegance or originality, but on its ability to withstand experimental testing. 

Throughout this website, I present the logical development of the framework, the experimental constraints it attempts to satisfy, the predictions it generates, and the evidence that may ultimately support or refute it. The goal is not merely to propose an explanation, but to encourage critical evaluation and experimental investigation.

Scientific progress depends upon the willingness to question accepted assumptions while remaining equally willing to abandon new ideas that fail experimental scrutiny. I therefore welcome constructive criticism, alternative interpretations, and attempts to falsify the proposed mechanism.

If this framework succeeds, it will be because it explains observations more coherently than existing alternatives and continues to survive rigorous testing. If it fails, the search itself will still have narrowed the range of possible solutions and moved us closer to understanding one of biology's greatest unsolved problems.

The challenge of explaining first-person experience remains one of the deepest questions in science. The ideas presented here represent my attempt to address this challenge through a theory-driven, constraint-based framework grounded in experimental neuroscience. Whether this framework ultimately succeeds depends entirely on its ability to withstand experimental testing and critical scrutiny.

Because the proposed framework spans multiple disciplines and draws upon a large number of experimental observations, it cannot be presented adequately within the space limitations of a conventional research article.This website therefore serves as a repository for the underlying rationale, experimental constraints, predictions, and supporting evidence. It will continue to evolve as new evidence, analyses, and experimental tests become available. 

About the author

I am Kunjumon Vadakkan, a neuroscience researcher whose research has focused on understanding the fundamental operational principles of the nervous system. My academic training spans medicine, biochemistry, molecular biology, neuroscience, neurology, cognitive neurology, and physics, providing perspectives from both experimental biology and theory-driven sciences. After studying medicine in India, I pursued postgraduate studies in biochemistry before conducting research in molecular biology. I later completed graduate training in neuroscience at the University of Toronto, followed by postdoctoral research at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Subsequently, I completed residency training in Neurology at the University of Manitoba and fellowship training in Cognitive Neurology at the University of Toronto. My subsequent undergraduate study of physics at Memorial University in Newfoundland reinforced my view that understanding first-person inner sensations requires an approach analogous to those used in physics to infer imperceptible entities from multiple independent constraints. These diverse experiences gradually led to the development of the semblance hypothesis, a theory-driven, constraint-based framework that seeks to explain the generation of first-person properties while integrating experimental findings across multiple levels of nervous system function.